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An examination of international accounting standard-setting due process and 
the implications for legitimacy  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the due process of accounting standard-setting by focusing on 
relative levels of stakeholder and jurisdictional influence. We draw on legitimacy 
theory to explain our findings and ask what implications any bias might have for the 
IASB. This study extends the standard-setting literature in three ways. First, we 
create a weighted coding system to analyse the content of comment letters. Second, 
we test for differences in the acceptance rate of comments made by stakeholders 
and by jurisdictions. Third, we analyse IASB discussion documentation that sheds 
light on the decision-making process. Previous studies have focused on whether 
outcome-oriented proposals are ‘influential’ (persuasive) by focusing on success 
rates measured as proposed changes being accepted. We widen this definition to 
include whether constituents’ views are discussed. We find that accounting firms 
appear to have significantly less influence than other stakeholders. We also find that 
the IASB reacts less favourably to UK proposals but comments from the US are 
more likely to be discussed. A lack of fairness (real or perceived) could jeopardise 
perceptions of the procedural legitimacy of the due process and ultimately impair the 
IASB’s cognitive legitimacy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“The genius of the FASB’s due process is the cultivation of the belief among 
constituents that their input exerts some degree of influence upon the ultimate 
content of standards.” Fogarty (1994: 220) 
 
Fogarty’s (1994) review of the FASB standard-setting process identified a series of 
constraints, opportunities and dilemmas. The question of whether certain 
stakeholder groups hold greater levels of (relative) influence has been the subject of 
much work and researchers have studied this phenomenon in both domestic and 
international contexts (e.g. Martens and McEnroe, 1991, 1998; Kwok and Sharp, 
2005; Cortese, Irvine and Kaidonis, 2010). Almost invariably, influence and 
legitimacy are considered together (Hussein and Ketz, 1991; McEnroe, 1993; 
Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Larson, 2002; Chua and 
Taylor, 2008; Burlaud and Colasse, 2011; Danjou and Walton, 2012). This paper 
reviews the IASB’s standard-setting due process in relation to the complex and 
controversial subject of financial instruments disclosures (International Financial 
Reporting Standard 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures [IFRS 7], 2005) through the 
lens of legitimacy theory. In particular, this study investigates the following research 
questions (RQ): 
  
RQ1: Is there evidence that certain stakeholder groups are more influential 
(measured in terms of (i) discussed and (ii) accepted proposed changes) than their 
peers in the financial instruments disclosure standard-setting process? 
RQ2: Is there evidence that constituents in certain jurisdictions are more influential 
than others in the financial instruments disclosure standard-setting process? 
 
This study is motivated, at least in part, by criticisms of, and challenges to, the 
IASB’s procedural legitimacy (e.g. Larson and Herz, 2013; Burlaud and Colasse, 
2011; Kwok and Sharp, 2005). This is an important issue within an accounting 
standard-setting context. Procedural legitimacy is a type of moral legitimacy which 
can be created (lost), maintained, and built (impaired) according to levels of 
perceived independence and impartiality (Suchman, 1995). Suchman (1995) 
distinguishes legitimacy into three primary forms: pragmatic, moral and cognitive. 
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These are known to co-exist, overlap and intertwine (Brinkerhoff, 2005; O’Dwyer, 
Owen and Unerman, 2011) and prior work suggests that there is a “durability 
pendulum” (O’Dwyer, Owen and Unerman, 2011: 36). Pragmatic legitimacy is 
considered to be the easiest form to obtain but the least durable, whereas cognitive 
legitimacy is the most difficult to obtain but the most durable once it is there 
(O’Dwyer, Owen and Unerman, 2011, Cashore, 2002; Kumar and Das, 2007). 
Cognitive legitimacy is the result of constituents’ long-term experiences and their 
perceptions of the organisation’s on-going pragmatic and moral legitimacy (Kumar 
and Das, 2007). Thus, concerns over the moral (procedural) legitimacy are not only 
immediately problematic, but they also put at risk levels of pragmatic and cognitive 
legitimacy (O’Dwyer, Owen and Unerman, 2011).  
 
On the one hand, some believe that the answer to the IASB’s procedural legitimacy 
problem lies with the provision of greater transparency and hence there have been 
calls over the years for improvements (Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes, 1994; Yen, 
Hirst and Hopkins, 2007; Stenka and Taylor, 2010). On the other hand, increasing 
transparency is likely to be self-defeating as it exposes the processes to public 
scrutiny (Herbohn and Herbohn, 1999: 421) and does not necessarily lead to better 
decision-making. Johnson and Solomons (1984) argued that open public debate was 
required to justify decisions made and actions taken; without this, there are fears that 
this process might be viewed as symbolic rather than substantive (e.g. Fogarty, 
1994; Weetman, 2001). This is an important issue which can now be addressed. 
 
The IASB has responded to these transparency concerns by making available 
documentation dating back to 2001 which includes Board minutes, technical working 
group minutes and staff observer notes1. This study considers the evolution of IFRS 
                                                                
1 For ease of access reasons, we would recommend that researchers who are interested in reviewing the 
widest possible range of IASB documentation available, might consider those standard-setting projects which 
are either recently completed or on-going. While it is possible to access summaries of Board discussions from 
2001 onwards (http://www.ifrs.org/Updates/IASB-Updates/Pages/IASB-Updates.aspx), for projects pre-2006 
(note: it is possible that this date will shift forward as time elapses), much of the remaining detail including 
comment letters, observer notes and details of joint working group meetings have been archived (link to all 
projects since 2006 in alphabetical order: http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-
Projects/Pages/All_projects.aspx). For projects that pre-date these, details can be requested directly from IASB 
staff and it is useful to contact the technical officer heading up the working group. For example, during our 
study we contacted the technical officer in charge of the financial instruments working group. It is also useful 
to note that through the search function of IFRS.org archived information can be found e.g. the first 50 
comment letters related to ED 7 can be found at: http://www.ifrs.org/Documents/Disclosures10041_50.zip. 
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7 from initiation (2002) through to approval (2005). Due to the complex and 
controversial nature of financial instruments reporting (Gebhardt, 2012), the 
accounting community and standard-setting bodies’ credibility as an authority have 
been brought into question (Le Guyader, 2013). Hence, we should not be surprised if 
the Board allowed themselves to be guided by constituent opinion during the due 
process to maintain its perceived legitimacy (Richardson and Eberlein, 2011). The 
principal advantages of examining IFRS 7 are: first, documentation relating to 
meetings of the Board and technical working group was available covering the whole 
period; second, this is an area where there were strongly competing interests and 
conflicting opinions between stakeholders and across jurisdictions; and third, there 
have been ex-post criticisms of IFRS 7’s requirements (Walton, 2004; Burlaud and 
Colasse, 2011; Harrington, 2012; Gebhardt, 2012).  
 
Until now, prior work has relied almost exclusively on vote-counting systems to 
measure the relative influence of stakeholder groups – largely overlooking the 
potential implications of jurisdictional bias (see Zeff, 2002, 2007) and ranking 
comments equally (see McEnroe, 1993) – and defined constituent success as the 
number of comments accepted as a proportion of those made (e.g. Yen, Hirst and 
Hopkins, 2007; Kwok and Sharp, 2005). One problem with this narrow definition of 
success is that success is not one-dimensional. This study aims to refine and 
improve this definition as well as proposing a workable methodological approach 
which future researchers might employ. 
 
Early work clung tightly to the underlying presumption that respondents actively 
supported (opposed) regulations that promoted (frustrated) self-interest during the 
due process (Cooper and Sherer, 1984). Whilst this may be one explanation, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Constituents also make information available through their websites. However, to ensure completeness in the 
data gathering exercise, it is important to know what you are searching for. To this end, Deloitte’s IAS Plus 
resource is helpful in filling the gap. This site provides a full suite of documents released by the IASB as well as 
other stakeholder organisations. This is updated on a monthly basis and, by way of illustration, the link to ED 
7’s release can be found at: http://www.iasplus.com/en/news/2004/July/news1406. Furthermore, the Big 4 
accounting firms write up their own observer notes for IASB meetings and make them available on their 
websites. For example, the following is a link to Deloitte’s observer notes from the ‘Disclosure Initiative’ 
meeting held during October 2014: http://www.iasplus.com/en/meeting-notes/iasb/2014/october/disclosure-
initiative-2. Many of the large accounting firms also provide guidance notes and commentary to their (current 
and potential) clients which are available online, for instance, a link to PwC’s financial reporting guidance can 
be found at: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ifrs-reporting. 
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position has been modified and extended over the years and most commentators 
now agree that the active engagement of stakeholders stems from a political and 
social agenda as much as a technical one, i.e. not necessarily dominated by the 
economic (direct cost) notion of self-interest (Demski, 1973; Sutton, 1984; Puro, 
1984; Mitchell and Sikka, 1993; McLeay, Ordelheide, and Young, 2000; Zeff, 2002, 
2007; Whittington, 2005).  
 
Furthermore, it is widely held that socio-political bodies, such as the IASB, must be 
seen to be acting fairly and without bias to create, maintain and build their legitimacy 
(e.g. Hussein and Ketz, 1991; McEnroe, 1993; Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes, 1994; 
Suchman, 1995; Chua and Taylor, 2008; Danjou and Walton, 2012). Indeed, 
theorists go further than this in proposing that a legitimate decision-making 
organisation must exist to facilitate the continuance of the institutional environment 
as a whole (e.g. Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976; Scott, 1981; Fogarty, 
1993; Chua and Taylor, 2008). The standard-setting literature unites on the principle 
that any unfair bias shown towards one group risks impairing stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the standard-setters’ cognitive legitimacy, otherwise known as ‘taken-
for-grantedness’ (Suchman, 1995: 582). 
 
Achieving perceived fairness, however, is clearly not straightforward. Accounting 
regulations ignite competing positions and conflicting interests amongst constituents. 
In this milieu, some stakeholders will simply be better informed than others through a 
combination of knowledge and experience. Therefore, it seems unavoidable that 
there will be times when the standard-setter will (and should) deliberately allow 
certain responses (respondents) to carry higher levels of relative influence (e.g. 
Larson, 2002). Thus it is overly restrictive to define relative influence and success 
according to the number of constituent proposals that are accepted.  
 
To overcome this issue we first classified comment letter responses into one of three 
categories: outcome-oriented; theory-oriented; or, other (Yen, Hirst and Hopkins, 
2007). The outcome-oriented comments (i.e. those that requested amendments) 
were then analysed according to their nature and weight (minor, moderate or major). 
This study introduces a usable weighting system to prevent all comments being 
mistakenly treated equally. A comment requesting a change to a misspelt word 
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should not be viewed as the equivalent of a request to delete a paragraph. 
Respondents were sub-divided firstly between stakeholder groups and secondly 
according to jurisdiction. Following this, we reconciled the Exposure Draft (ED) with 
the Standard on a word-by-word basis to establish what changes had been made 
and then reconciled whether the changes proposed by letter writers had been 
adjusted for or not. Finally, we reviewed IASB discussion documentation to see 
whether the issues – accepted or otherwise – had been discussed and whether this 
impacted on acceptance.  
 
In summary, this study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, this study 
tests for jurisdictional influence. The emergence of an ‘international’ financial 
reporting community alongside the IASB-FASB convergence project means that this 
is an important issue which should be considered alongside the influence of 
stakeholder groups. Second, as with several papers before it, this study examines 
lobbying influence (persuasiveness). However, rather than viewing success as the 
number of votes versus accepted proposals, we also investigate whether 
constituents’ proposals are discussed by the standard-setter. While ‘accepted 
proposals’ is clearly one indicator of constituent influence, if the comments are not 
discussed it is unlikely an amendment would be made. Discussion is the first phase 
of a multi-stage persuasiveness process. Furthermore, constituents’ request 
amendments to requirements for a variety of reasons including economic, social and 
political. Therefore, another measure of success is having your voice heard. Third, 
we undertake a multi-phase manual content analysis that enables us to analyse 
each comment individually and explore whether any influence is consistent between 
requests for minor, moderate and major changes. We introduce this weighting 
system to mitigate treating all comments equally regardless of the nature of the 
proposed outcome.   
 
This paper continues as follows: Section 2 discusses background, prior literature and 
theory; Section 3 introduces the research methods; Section 4 presents and 
discusses the findings; and finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Background, prior literature and theory 
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2.1 Background 
The subject of financial instruments disclosure standard-setting and the role of 
stakeholders is interesting for several reasons. Work shows that disclosures are both 
value relevant (Seow and Tam, 2002; Wang, Alam and Makar, 2005) and informative 
(Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele, 2011; Kravet and Muslu, 2013). 
Derivative financial instruments holding and trading is significant to the global 
economy. The Bank for International Settlements (2012) report that the worldwide 
outstanding notional value of OTC derivatives was US$632 trillion, with gross market 
value US$25 trillion. In Quarter 4 of 2012 alone, the total value of the derivatives 
traded on organised exchanges was US$262 trillion. The Office for National 
Statistics report in their 2012 Pink Book (p.180) that at the end of 2010, UK 
derivative assets totalled c.£3 trillion (30% of total UK assets); and derivative 
liabilities also totalled c.£3 trillion (28% of total UK liabilities). Financial instruments, 
however, describes more than derivatives and for the years ended 2007/082, 
financial instruments represented over half (53%) of the UK’s 350 largest firms’ 
assets.  
 
The proposed requirements in the financial instruments disclosure Exposure Draft 
(ED 7, 2004) necessitated varying levels of quantitative and qualitative disclosures 
according to the scale, scope, manner and complexity in which financial instruments 
are used by organizations and the ways that the associated risks are managed. 
Accounting firms stepped forward to offer advice and seminars on this difficult and 
controversial topic (e.g. Deloitte, 2006; Ernst & Young, 2007; KPMG, 2007; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007). Given the levels of attention and economic 
significance, it seems logical to expect that: (i) company management would devote 
considerable resource to their financial instruments disclosure strategies, and (ii) the 
standard setting community would closely consider the development of the 
requirements. Yet unfortunately, there is currently little known about these issues 
(see Gebhardt’s [2012] discussion of non-financial firms).  
 
                                                                
2 IFRS 7 came into force for years ended on or after 1 January 2007 hence the 2007/08 figures are shown 
above. A review of 2013/14 data shows that this percentage continues to reflect levels of financial instruments 
usage. 
Page 8 of 40 
 
Furthermore, the breadth and depth of IFRS 7 (2005; which emerged from ED 7) is 
unrivalled. The published Standard had 34 balance sheet disclosure requirements, a 
further 10 related to the income statement and equity, 49 related to risk, 2 related to 
adoptions and exemptions and 38 other requirements. These 133 requirements can 
be further broken down as: 57 hard rules, 47 soft rules3, and 29 principles. The 
principles-based requirements cover sensitive issues such as market, credit and 
liquidity risk. Despite the lengthy discussion period, the requirements have been 
criticised ex-post (Burlaud and Colasse, 2011). 
 
2.2 Stakeholder groups 
 
There is some evidence that certain stakeholders exhibit greater levels of influence 
over the standard-setting process (e.g. Kwok and Sharp, 2005) but the results are 
not generalisable. This is unsurprising. There is a strong case that relative influence 
is context-specific (Weetman, 2001). Studies from the US, UK, Australia and 
elsewhere suggest that the standard-setting process is neither systematically aligned 
to any group nor dominated by one (e.g. Brown, 1981; Sutton, 1984; Tutticci, 
Dunstan and Holmes, 1994; McLeay, Ordelheide and Young, 2000; Zeff, 2002; Kwok 
and Sharp, 2005; Giner and Arce, 2012).  Throughout the prior work, influence has 
been associated with persuasion and evidence suggests that levels of 
persuasiveness shift between groups according to the issue under review (Martens 
and McEnroe, 1991, 1998; Cortese, Irvine and Kaidonis, 2010). Indeed, the optimum 
position for the standard setter might be to keep all parties “optimally disgruntled” 
(Fogarty, 1994; Daley and Tranter, 1990).  
 
Much attention has been devoted to establishing whether the elite (Big Four) 
accounting firms have special influence (Puro, 1984, Hussein and Ketz, 1991). Many 
have argued that these firms actively favour complexity to promote ‘mystique’ and 
support regulation changes that are likely to increase their fee income by virtue of 
additional audit effort, lifting entry barriers and raising reputational capital (e.g. Puro, 
1984; Willmott, 1986; McLeay, Ordelheide, and Young, 2000; Cortese, Irvine and 
Kaidonis, 2010). Their strength is thought to derive from being alumni in the 
                                                                
3 Hard rules provide guidance as to what is permissible in advance whereas soft rules require judgement to be 
employed. 
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decision-making process as well as their knowledge, expertise, experience, 
resources and IASC (IFRS) Foundation funding levels (US Senate Metcalf 
Committee Report, 1976; Puro, 1984; Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Hussein and Ketz, 
1991; Mitchell and Sikka, 1993; Georgiou, 2010; Financial Reporting Council, 2012). 
The evidence to support this influence hypothesis, however, is mixed and 
inconclusive. It might be that accounting firms’ publicly made comments may not be 
representative of those made privately, or that observable levels of influence differ to 
levels during the non-observable phases of the process. Again, however, there is 
little to suggest that this is the case (Georgiou, 2004, 2010). 
 
While the elite audit firms have attracted the most attention during the standard-
setting process, the stakeholder group who has been found to be disproportionately 
favoured4 are preparers (Kwok and Sharp, 2005). It would seem however that their 
persuasiveness is significantly reduced when they are unsupported by other 
constituents or networks (McLeay, Ordelheide and Young, 2000). In the past, they 
have been the most active respondents during the observable phase (Kwok and 
Sharp, 2005; McLeay, Ordelheide and Young, 2000; Larson, 1997) but this is 
generally no longer the case. A review of recent exposure drafts’ comment letters 
indicates that there has been a shift towards Regulatory and Professional Bodies5 
(RPBs) engaging on their behalf (Larson and Herz, 2013 [for a summary, see 
appendix B, pp.146-148]). 
 
This shift should come as no surprise. On a practical note, the funding pattern has 
changed6. There has been a recent move towards the IASB receiving donations 
                                                                
4 In terms of proposed changes being accepted. 
5 Please note that RPBs includes the representative industry bodies. 
6 The funding arrangements have changed substantively in terms of their scope and their nature. In 2006 a 
funding review was undertaken and four underpinning principles were agreed: broad based, compelling, open-
ended and country- or jurisdiction specific. These were revised and refined as part of the IFRS Foundation 
Strategy Review 2011 (2012) which briefly outlines the changes and the rationale (p.22): “At the outset, the 
Foundation was financed through voluntary contributions by some 200 organisations. Occasionally, this partial 
dependence on voluntary contributions raised two concerns by a few observers. One was a possible lack of 
objectivity because of the temptation to provide special consideration in the standard-setting process to 
important financial supporters. Conversely, there were suggestions that supporters, dissatisfied with the 
outcome of a rigorous standard-setting process, might withdraw funding and disrupt the IASB’s work. While 
neither of these concerns materialised in practice, there was a sense that dependence on voluntary 
contributions from largely private sources was inappropriate for an organisation acting in the public interest 
and could deprive the organisation of necessary resources in the future. Since 2006 the Trustees have sought 
to establish national financing regimes, proportionate to a country’s relative GDP, which would establish a levy 
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through the RPBs as representatives of their members and/or jurisdictions rather 
than directly through individual entities. Secondly, RPBs and preparers share 
common ground. They both contend that greater disclosure has drawbacks, 
including increased preparation, audit and reporting costs alongside unintended 
consequences such as the release of competition-sensitive information. Thirdly, they 
are likely to be aware that coalition lobbying is generally more persuasive (e.g. 
Cortese, Irvine, and Kaidonis, 2010). 
 
2.3 Jurisdiction 
 
The Financial Crisis Advocacy Group7 (2009: 14) stated that the standard-setting 
due process was set up “to ensure that all voices in all geographical regions have an 
adequate opportunity to make their view known”. Their report continued: “Wide 
consultation also promotes excellence, neutrality, the identification of unintended 
consequences, and ultimately, broad acceptance of the legitimacy of the standards 
that are adopted”. However, there are many cultural, social, economic and financial 
barriers impairing the ability and willingness of stakeholders from certain jurisdictions 
from behaving in this manner (Whittington, 2008; MacArthur, 1996, 1999; Larson and 
Street, 2004). Thus response rates are lower to the IASB than to domestic standard 
setting bodies (Larson and Herz, 2013).  
 
Yet the issue of jurisdictional influence is often overlooked in the literature (Jorissen, 
Lybaert, Orens and Van Der Tas, 2014; Larson and Herz, 2013). Geographical bias 
has the potential to be even more divisive than showing favour towards stakeholder 
groups. A lack of fairness and integrity might encourage nations to withdraw from the 
IFRS-zone, postpone IFRS adoption, problematise enforcement, and/or reduce 
donations (Hail, Leuz and Wysocki, 2010; Zeff, 2002). This would fundamentally 
impact on the cognitive legitimacy of the IASB. 
 
It is commonly presumed that there is an Anglo-American bias. There are several 
reasons for this: the importance attached to the convergence agenda (Tarca, 2004; 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
on companies or provide an element of publicly supported financing.” (for further details see 
http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IFRS-Foundation/Oversight/Financing/Pages/Financing.aspx) 
7 Jointly undertaken by the IASB and FASB. 
Page 11 of 40 
 
Larson, 1997; Botzem and Quack, 2007; Grinyer and Russell, 1992; Zeff, 2002), the 
London-based IASB headquarters reducing transaction costs and increasing 
opportunities for conversation (Street, 2006; Camfferman and Zeff, 2007), non-US 
companies listing on US stock exchanges (Parker and Morris, 2001), and the 
importance of the US capital markets (Tarca, 2004; Parker and Morris, 2001; 
Camfferman and Zeff, 2007). In more recent times, Europe has also been 
considered to be influential (Larson and Street, 2004; Larson and Brown, 2001; 
Larson, 2007). The influence of the final group – the rest of the world – remains 
unexplored until now. 
 
2.4 Forms of legitimacy 
 
Given that this study explores perceptions of fairness during a public process, 
legitimacy theory is important. There is a strategic view of legitimacy (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975) and an institutional one (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The latter suggests 
that environmental dynamics shape organisational life and structure. The former 
lends credence to the notion that organisational actions – such as information 
manipulation – can garner societal support. Suchman (1995: 574) synthesises the 
organisational legitimacy literature and arrives at the following definition: “legitimacy 
is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions”. Furthermore, Woodward, Edwards and Birkin (1996: 329) 
provide a useful addendum to this description which suggests that organisations 
operate “under a mandate that may be withdrawn”. There is an organisational 
accountability between the agent (standard-setter) and principal (society) which is 
enhanced when the agent does the “right” things. Referring to an accounting 
standard-setting context, Burlaud and Colasse (2011: 24) state categorically that: 
“The legitimacy (of the IASB) is not innate. It is not natural or pre-existing… It is 
constructed and managed.” 
 
It can be unhelpful, however, to speak about legitimacy in general terms. Instead, 
Suchman (1995) identified three primary forms of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and 
cognitive. These co-existent divisions, which operate on a “durability pendulum” 
(O’Dwyer, Owen and Unerman, 2011), provide a useful framework for our work. An 
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organisation, such as the IASB, strives to attain cognitive legitimacy but this relies on 
constituents’ cumulative experiences regarding the organisation’s pragmatic and 
moral legitimacy (Kumar and Das, 2007). We briefly define these primary forms, 
drawing particular attention to influence (pragmatic), procedural (moral) and 
cognitive legitimacy given the relevance to the research questions posed by this 
study. 
 
Pragmatic legitimacy refers to a sense of immediacy between organisation and 
audience, where discourse is dominated by self-interest. As Suchman notes (p.578), 
it is common for audiences to become constituents who scrutinise the actions of the 
organisation to evaluate the consequences for them. Whilst it is difficult to believe 
that any constituent exerts power in its traditional sense – i.e. a stakeholder who has 
a conscious and consistent ability to change accounting requirements against the 
wishes of the Board and other stakeholders – there is a strong argument towards 
one variant of pragmatic legitimacy known as influence legitimacy. Advocates of 
influence legitimacy believe that by relinquishing some influence to stakeholders – in 
this case, adjusting for certain proposed amendments to accounting standards – the 
organisation secures an on-going commitment from them (e.g. Palazzo and Scherer, 
2006).  
 
Moral legitimacy (or normative legitimacy) rests on the consequential notion that 
legitimacy is attained where an organisation ‘makes the right decisions’ rather than 
necessarily just ‘making the right decisions for the constituent’. Moral legitimacy is 
underpinned by a belief in ‘rightness’ or a pro-social logic (Suchman, 1995; 
O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009). Captured within the boundaries of moral legitimacy 
is procedural legitimacy. This has frequently been called into question in the context 
of standard-setting (e.g. Burlaud and Colasse, 2011; Kwok and Sharp, 2005; 
Martens and McEnroe, 1991, 1998). Procedural legitimacy is rooted in the 
perception of an organisation’s independence and impartiality. This can be built over 
time according to constituent experiences (O’Dwyer, Owen and Unerman, 2011). An 
organisation seeking to address procedural legitimacy concerns may choose to 
increase levels of transparency in the process (e.g. Fogarty, 1994; Herbohn and 
Herbohn, 1999).  
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In Suchman’s (1995) typology, the final primary form of legitimacy is cognitive 
legitimacy. Inevitably this is difficult to identify because of the subtlety in its definition. 
It is, however, probably the most powerful form because it exists where an 
organisation, process or procedure is considered unchallengeable or where there is 
thought to be no alternative8. Thus, for legitimacy scholars, organisations are 
generally considered to be more likely to attain higher levels of cognitive legitimacy 
where their decisions are perceived to be pragmatically and morally centred (e.g. 
Parsons, 1960; Suchman, 1995; O’Dwyer, Owen and Unerman, 2011).  
 
There are thought to be limitations at a fundamental level to the IASB’s (IASC) 
cognitive legitimacy. Maybe because of the monopolistic nature of standard-setting 
bodies, as early as the 1980’s the IASC’s institutional (cognitive) legitimacy was 
under investigation; and being defended (Wallace, 1990). Burlaud and Colasse 
(2011) point out that the IASB/C lacked an initial political mandate and this situation 
continues. Wallace (1990: 11) acknowledged the absence of a legal framework or 
mandate, but noted that the IASC still had sufficient authority and “broad public 
support” (p.22) alongside an appropriately substantive and fair procedural due 
process which allows them to continue.  
 
The question of a political mandate continues to be contested. The links between 
IOSCO and the IASC have been used as a means to highlight the degree of 
perceived legitimacy for the standard-setters (Danjou and Walton, 2012; 
Camfferman and Zeff, 2007). Further, the continuance of good relations between the 
IASB and market regulators enhances this argument. There is also political support 
for the IASB’s position (Danjou and Walton, 2012). However, without a formal legal 
or political mandate the IASB relies on constituent support and this, in turn, is 
dependent upon perceived fairness in the due process (moral, procedural 
legitimacy). Hence, we derive our expectation that comments from stakeholder 
groups regardless of jurisdiction will be treated fairly and free from bias. 
 
                                                                
8 Such a situation could be considered to exist in the case of international standard setting. Since many 
countries (have adopted and continue to) adopt IFRS/IAS this lends a ‘taken-for-grantedness’ to iGAAP and the 
IASB. It is costly to make a transition to a new regime (politically, economically and socially). Nevertheless, 
there are alternatives, for example, a return to domestic GAAP or a move to US GAAP. 
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3. Research methods 
 
3.1 Background 
The research focuses on a detailed analysis of the public comment letters, minutes 
of IASB Board meetings and notes from technical working group meetings. Lobbying 
research has by and large been forced to focus on public comment letters to 
measure levels of influence (Jorissen, Lybaert, Orens and Van Der Tas, 2012; Yen, 
Hirst and Hopkins, 2007; Kwok and Sharp, 2005; Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes, 
1994). However, there is evidence that suggests this might not be such a problem. 
For example, Georgiou (2004: 230) suggests that: “Overall comment letters appear 
to be a good proxy for the use of other, less overt, lobbying methods”. 
 
The principal criticism levied against this comment-letter oriented work is that it relies 
on a system of naïve vote-counting which fails to take into account: (i) whether the 
response is representative of the stakeholder’s viewpoint, and (ii) the relative 
strength of the response. In defence against the former, some fall back on public 
choice theory (Giner and Arce, 2012: 661) and argue that constituents are motivated 
by self-interest and that “participants… usually provide arguments to support their 
positions”. The relative strength problem has proved a more thorny issue which few 
have tried to address (McEnroe [1993] being a notable exception). 
 
As with prior work, we adopt a pluralist framework (see Giner and Arce, 2012; Kwok 
and Sharp, 2005; McLeay, Ordelheide and Young, 2000) whereby we measure 
relative influence as a function of the level of proposal acceptance measured against 
total proposals made. Influence operates on the basis of persuasiveness. Amongst 
others, Giner and Arce (2012: 661) claim to review “the entire process: the comment 
letters, the underlying arguments and the IASB’s decisions”. Our analysis includes 
these elements but the reconciliation between ED 7 and IFRS 79 and the inclusion of 
the additional IASB documentation available (meeting notes) allows us to add an 
extra dimension to our understanding of the key variable: relative influence. There 
seems to be a problem with a persuasiveness assumption, which proposes that one 
constituent has more influence because their comments are accepted more 
                                                                
9 Available on request. 
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frequently. Therefore we extend this definition by contributing a second component, 
namely, whether the comment is discussed. This is the first study to undertake this 
analysis and thus contributes a more refined methodological approach to the existing 
literature.  
 
3.2 Comment letter and meeting notes coding 
  
A stand-alone financial instruments disclosure standard was first discussed at Board 
level in 2002. An exposure draft (ED 7) was released on 22 July 2004, and a final 
Standard was released during August 2005 (IFRS 710). Of the 30 Board meetings 
during the discussion period, nine discussed constituent feedback and proposed 
amendments to ED 7. There were also several support meetings whose consultation 
informed these. The ED attracted 106 comment letters and the text of all bar three of 
the original 50 paragraphs was amended during the process. The average response 
contained approximately 22 separately identifiable comments. The 2,343 responses 
were classified into three categories as per prior research (e.g. Yen, Hirst and 
Hopkins, 2007)11 as follows: outcome-oriented (475); theory-oriented (986); ‘other’ 
(882). The number of responses is within an acceptable and expected range.12 
 
Identifying stakeholder groups is not straightforward. We followed prior research and 
classified responses into one of four stakeholder groups: accounting firms; 
preparers; users; and RPBs (e.g. Kwok and Sharp, 2005). Instead of blindly 
accepting that the opinions of these constituents diverged, we tested whether their 
responses were significantly different. We categorise stakeholders into groups of 
respondents by jurisdiction and by stakeholder group. We control for the quantity of 
responses and test the number of pages, comments and proposals against the null 
                                                                
10 It is this version of the Standard which is the subject of this study as this was approved and made effective for years commencing on or 
after 1 January 2007. 
11 For example: Brown and Feroz, 1992: 112 responses; McEnroe, 1993: 100 responses; Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes, 1994: 113 
responses; Weetman, Davie and Collins, 1996: 104 responses; Martens and McEnroe, 1998: 20 responses; Yen, Hirst and Hopkins, 2007: 
278 responses; Larson (2007: 207) reports an examination of “18 Draft Interpretations… A total of 272 respondents from 40 countries 
generated 714 comment letters”; Stenka and Taylor (2010) reviewed four ED’s which attracted 42, 56, 36 and 60 responses respectively.  
12 Appropriate comparators for response levels are other FIs EDs from the same period. The combined IAS 32 Financial Instruments: 
Presentation (IAS 32) (2002) and IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IAS 39) (2002) project led to 164 responses. 
A number of EDs were released during 2004 detailing proposals related to IAS 39 including (number of responses in parentheses): fair 
value option (116); insurance contracts (61); cash flow hedge accounting of forecast intra group (58); transition and initial recognition of 
financial assets and financial liabilities (37). In addition, the proposed presentational (IAS 32) amendments in relation to puttable 
instruments (2006) attracted 88 responses. The IFRS 9 Financial Instruments (2011) (the replacement for IAS 39) exposure drafts attracted 
significantly greater numbers of comments. Responses were as follows: Classification and measurement ED – 245 responses; Impairment 
ED – 192 responses ; Hedging ED – 162 responses; IFRS 10 Leases – 302 responses. 
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hypothesis that comment letters exhibit the same characteristics. Kruskal-Wallis one-
way analyses of rank tests confirm significant differences in each category (pages: 
p<0.01; comments: p<0.01; outcome-oriented comments: p<0.05).  
 
To analyse the comment letters we developed a three-phase content analysis 
approach. A preliminary review of the comment letters and IASB documentation 
revealed that the number of separately identifiable comments and responses would 
be numerous and varied. Lobbyists responded to a wide range of issues largely, but 
not exclusively, structured around 10 broad questions13 posed in the ‘invitation to 
comment’. To mitigate coding inconsistency we analysed 10 letters using the 
orientation framework described above. On completion of this exercise, the 
researchers discussed the appropriateness of the coding scheme and its ability to 
capture and explore issues related to legitimacy. Though this set-up work was costly, 
it facilitated a more precise and consistent approach through later phases. Following 
this, we manually coded each of the 106 letters using QSR International NVivo.  
 
In the third phase, we separately analysed each of the outcome-oriented comments 
coding each specific proposal by respondent14 (Appendix A). Following this, we 
weighted them according to the nature and scope of their desired outcomes. Letters 
have become more complex over time and often contain multiple messages. Some 
researchers have classified letters as broadly supportive, neutral or unsupportive 
(e.g. Saemann, 1999; Mian and Smith, 1990) and developed basic ‘for and against’ 
systems. These have been enhanced to take account of the complexity of 
constituent letters. Notably Brown and Feroz (1992) assessed the level of support 
with specific questions, while McEnroe (1993) used external experts to rank the 
importance of comments. Instead, we devised a readily employable system that 
differentiates between minor, moderate and major proposals (Table 1). 
 
--------------------- Insert table 1 here ------------------------------ 
 
3.3 Intercoder reliability testing 
                                                                
13 The 10 questions span four pages and run to almost 1,200 words (ED 7: 4-7) therefore they have not been reproduced in full here. 
However, to illustrate the freedom provided by the IASB to comment on issues, Question 10 simply states: “Do you have any other 
comments on the draft IFRS, Implementation Guidance and Illustrative Examples?” 
14 A summary is provided as appendix A. Tables available on request. 
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Weaknesses of content analysis principally arise because ‘interpretation [of text] is in 
part an art’ (Krippendorff, 2004; Weber, 1990 [p.62]). Krippendorff (2004) argues the 
key problems stem from a potential lack of stability, accuracy and reproducibility. 
One solution to these issues is to compare the results of an independent expert’s 
analysis with the original coder’s. In this case, six letters were independently 
reviewed which equates to over 10% of the word count. The Kappa coefficients for 
intercoder reliability (κ=0.64 to κ=0.92) are all significant. The majority of coding 
dissimilarities relate to interpretations of the coding schemata rather than 
disagreement. Miscodings are immaterial and relate principally to ‘other’ issues (i.e. 
not theory or outcome-oriented). For robustness, we reconcile the coding of 
outcome-oriented comments alone and the level of agreement is well above the 
commonly accepted 70% threshold (Lombard, Snyder‐Duch and Bracken, 2002).   
 
3.4 Methods of analysis 
 
Our research questions ask whether some stakeholders and jurisdictions are more 
influential than others. In accordance with expectations of fairness in the process 
derived from legitimacy theory, we test our data against the null hypotheses that 
there will be no significant differences between the proportion of proposals accepted 
(rejected) and discussed (ignored) from any (1) stakeholder group, or (2) jurisdiction. 
 
Initially, through a series of χ² tests, we investigated whether the observable 
variability in the levels of success across stakeholder groups and across jurisdictions 
was significant. First, we examined the relative influence of (1) stakeholder groups 
and (2) jurisdictions by testing the frequency of actual versus expected accepted 
(rejected) proposals on a total basis (see the left-hand ‘Total’ columns of Tables 2 
and 3). We applied the usual process of χ² tests to calculate expected rates. For 
example, we calculated the “expected‟ RPBs acceptance rate as: the total number of 
RPBs outcome-oriented comments (330), multiplied by the total number of accepted 
outcome-oriented comments across all stakeholder groups (211), divided by the total 
number of outcome-oriented comments (475).  
 
Second, we examined the frequency of actual versus expected acceptance by (1) 
stakeholder group and by (2) jurisdiction, across the three classification categories: 
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(i) minor, (ii) moderate, and (iii) major (see the second to fourth columns of Tables 2 
and 3). Third, we tested the frequency of actual versus expected, discussed 
(ignored) comments, by (1) stakeholder group and (2) jurisdiction (see the fifth to 
eighth columns of Tables 2 and 3). 
  
We are alert to the issues of unreliability stemming from low cell frequencies 
(commonly accepted to be five; Camilli and Hopkins, 1978). Combining categories, 
as usually suggested, would detrimentally impact on the fineness of the data as well 
as the relevance and importance of the cross-respondent analysis. Some argue that 
this minimum number is arbitrary and that it may be as low as one, provided that no 
more than 20% of the cells had frequencies less than five (Cochran, 1954: 420). 
Nevertheless this secondary analysis was run. Where this could not be satisfied, 
Fisher’s exact test was used for 2x2 comparisons. In the findings section that 
follows, we present the unadjusted (Pearson) chi-square results but note that the 
Cochran chi-square results provide no indication of unreliability of the former.  
 
As a second phase of testing, we undertook binomial distribution tests to investigate 
respondents’ relative influence in greater detail (results presented in tables 2 & 3). 
Responses from each stakeholder group and jurisdiction were investigated to 
ascertain whether: firstly, the final text of IFRS 7 was amended in light of the 
outcome-oriented comment, and secondly, whether the comment was discussed by 
the Board. Again, based on expectations derived from legitimacy theory we would 
expect to see no evidence of an observable bias. We test against the null 
hypotheses that there will be no significant differences between actual versus 
expected (a) acceptances and (b) discussions, of (i) minor, (ii) moderate or (iii) major 
proposals, by (1) stakeholder group or by (2) jurisdiction.  
 
4. Findings 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
 
With the exception of the single user respondent, accounting firms prepare the 
longest letters (8.6 pages) and make significantly more comments per letter than the 
other groups (44.4). RPBs produce the highest number of letters (77) and the most 
comments (1,632). Preparers have relatively lower response levels than has been 
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previously observed in similar studies (Weetman, 2001; Kwok and Sharp, 2005; 
McLeay, Ordelheide and Young, 2000). It is possible that the decrease in individual 
preparer responses is offset by the increase in the quantity of RPB responses i.e. 
representative organisations are responding on behalf of their members.15 
Theoretically, constituents’ active engagement (support) in the due process is 
preferable from a legitimacy perspective (Fogarty, 1993; Suchman, 1995; Chua and 
Taylor, 2008) and we provide evidence of this. However, in line with prior work, we 
also highlight a passive user (investor) community (e.g. Durocher, Fortin and Cote, 
2007); at least during this public phase of the due process. 
 
We summarise our findings in Tables 2 and 3.  Table 2 analyses amendments by 
acceptance and rejection across stakeholder groups.  Table 3 analyses amendments 
by acceptance and rejection across jurisdictions. Table 2 shows a breakdown of the 
475 proposed changes analysed by stakeholder group (user [11], preparers [55], 
accounting firms [79] and RPBs [330]) while Table 3 provides a breakdown by 
jurisdiction (Europe excluding the UK [201], Rest of the World [62], UK [120] and US 
[92]). These are further analysed according to whether: (i) they were accepted (211) 
or not (264), (ii) whether they were minor (24), moderate (227) or major (224) 
proposed amendments, and finally, (iii) whether the comment was discussed at an 
IASB Board or working group meeting (314) or not (161). These recorded levels of 
involvement are broadly consistent with those of similar studies (e.g. Stenka and 
Taylor, 2010; Yen et al., 2007; Kwok and Sharp, 2005; Tutticci, Dunstan and 
Holmes, 1994) and thus indicate a long-term active support which is considered 
essential to establish levels of “taken for grantedness” (e.g. O’Dwyer, Owen and 
Unerman, 2011). 
 
------------------------ Insert tables 2 and 3 here ------------------------------------ 
 
As we have noted in the literature review, to maintain procedural (moral) legitimacy it 
is desirable to have a fair and transparent due process that is free from observable 
bias (Suchman, 1995; Kwok and Sharp, 2005; Chua and Taylor, 2008) unless there 
is sufficient reason to act otherwise (Larson, 2002). The χ² tests, as described in 
                                                                
15 See footnote 6 for details of changes to funding arrangements which aim to shift emphasis from individual entities to representative 
organisations.  
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section 3.4, show no significant difference between actual and expected distributions 
in each table, with one exception. Based on the first column of Table 2, testing total 
accepted comments and total rejected comments against expectations, the  χ² test 
indicates that the null hypothesis may be rejected at a significance level of 5% 
(p=0.0500). Based on the first column of Table 3, responses from different 
jurisdictions appear to be treated fairly and free from bias on the basis of total 
accepted comments and total rejected comments (p=0.4529). When the successful 
comments are analysed according to their weighting classifications of minor, 
moderate and major, the χ² tests confirm our expectations that the IASB acted fairly 
and the process appears to be free from bias across both groups and jurisdictions. 
Further, these tests indicate no observable bias towards any stakeholder group or 
jurisdiction when deciding which proposals were discussed. 
 
Applying binomial distribution tests, as reported in Tables 2 and 3, we note, however, 
that levels of influence varied considerably between stakeholder groups and 
jurisdictions. We discuss these differences in sections 4.2 and 4.3, drawing on the 
results of the binomial tests.  Where cell frequencies are less than 5, we report these 
as “no result” (+) in the tables. 
 
4.2 Stakeholder group analysis 
 
The binomial distribution tests of the results of the stakeholder group indicate that 
the IASB apparently favoured the RPBs’ minor proposals (10) (p=0.039), and that 
preparers’ comments (43) were discussed more than would be expected (p=0.014). 
We note, however, in line with McLeay, Ordelheide, and Young’s (2000) study that 
this pro-discussion bias is not translated into higher acceptance levels, because 
there are no significant results for acceptance of preparer’s comments. 
 
Our findings also reveal that the IASB does not appear to treat accounting firms’ 
outcome-oriented comments evenly. Despite expectations derived from the 
assumption that the elite accounting firms will carry greater influence in the due 
process (US Senate, Metcalf Committee Report, 1976; Puro, 1984; Hussein and 
Ketz, 1991; Mitchell and Sikka, 1993; Sikka, 1992; Mitchell and Sikka, 1993; Brown, 
2006; Financial Reporting Council, 2012), instead these firms appear to have 
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significantly more rejected (55) (p=0.004) proposals than their peers. Their major 
(26) (p=0.001) and moderate (25) (p=0.075) comments are statistically significantly 
rejected at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. Though the Board and working 
groups considered the comments of the accounting firms fairly for discussion 
purposes (χ² tests indicate that no bias in the IASB’s comment discussion patterns 
across stakeholder groups), it seems that post-discussion the comments stood a 
statistically significantly greater chance of being rejected  (29) (p=0.027). 
 
Prior work suggests that stakeholders and constituents may be surprised by this 
result (Georgiou, 2010). Instead, however, we believe that this is not an entirely 
unexpected outcome. One stream of literature focuses on the potential weakness in 
the system that arises as a result of the strength of certain groups, including 
accounting firms, in the due process and hence undue levels of influence (e.g. 
Hussein and Ketz, 1991; Puro, 1984). However, this could be considered somewhat 
myopic for it is also important to consider the longer-term legitimacy of the agent (the 
accounting firms) and the organisation (the standard-setter) (cf. Burlaud and 
Colasse, 2011). In particular, it is worth acknowledging the potential negative impact 
that any widely observable procedural bias resulting from excessive influence would 
have on the durability pendulum of legitimacy dimensions. A decrease in perceived 
moral (procedural) legitimacy is likely to also impact on pragmatic legitimacy and 
cognitive legitimacy (Brinkerhoff, 2005; O’Dwyer, Owen and Unerman, 2011).   
 
The majority of accounting firms’ proposed amendments were rejected (70%) and 
there is nothing wrong with this. The preservation of the moral and cognitive 
legitimacy of the organisation rests on the Board being able to reject proposals which 
they do not think are appropriate (Larson, 2002). By virtue of the increased 
transparency in the due process – through the introduction of meeting notes and 
other associated documentation – this study has reviewed whether proposals are 
being considered and discussed. Given that accounting firms’ proposals are being 
discussed in an even manner before being rejected increases the validity and 
reasonableness of the rejection decision.  
 
4.3 Jurisdiction analysis 
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When we examine jurisdictional categories (i.e. UK, Europe, US and ROTW) and the 
classifications of comments (i.e. minor, moderate, major), the binomial distribution 
testing results show that the IASB does not appear to act with neutrality towards 
responses from certain jurisdictions. The binomial distribution tests show that 
moderate UK proposals (35) are significantly more rejected than those from other 
regions (p=0.013). However, minor proposals arising from the US (8) appear to have 
greater relative influence (p=0.025) and US outcome-oriented comments are more 
likely to be discussed (68) (p=0.033), and are subsequently more likely to be 
accepted (44) (p=0.069) than those from any other geographical respondent group.  
 
We propose that responses from the US may have been deemed more insightful 
because of US firms’ greater usage and reliance on financial instruments-based risk 
management programmes than other jurisdictions. Additionally, US regulators and 
standard-setters were first movers in the design and implementation of similar 
requirements and therefore US-based constituents could speak from experience 
(SFAS 119 [Oct, 1994]; SEC FRR No. 48 [Jan, 1997]; SFAS 133 [June, 1998]). 
While this could be claimed to be further evidence of an Anglo-American bias (Zeff, 
2002; Botzem and Quack, 2007), given that there is no evidence of a UK bias, a 
further possible explanation is that US success can be linked instead to a greater 
level of experience and knowledge. While this result may appear to run contrary to 
expectations of neutrality derived from legitimacy theory, in reality the IASB should 
accept outcome-oriented comments which improve the reporting regulations (Larson, 
2002). Indeed, cognitive legitimacy is built-up over time and, when attained, is highly 
durable. Thus, while constituents continue to actively support the due process, which 
they appear to, it is possible to suggest that the IASB’s cognitive legitimacy endures. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Prior work has sought to measure relative levels of constituent success on the basis 
of vote-counting systems often by determining whether proposed changes during the 
discussion period made through public comment letters were accepted (e.g. 
Willmott, 1986; Kwok and Sharp, 2005; Chua and Taylor, 2008; Burnett, Chen and 
Gunny, 2013). Instead, our study identifies whether these constituent comments are 
(i) discussed by the standard-setter and their representatives and (ii) whether they 
are accepted. We also explore these two variants of success across stakeholder 
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groups and jurisdictions. We reviewed comment letter responses to ED 7 alongside 
IASB discussion documentation (Board and working group meeting minutes) and 
reconciled these with IFRS 7 to determine whether there was any observable bias in 
the due process. In line with prior work, we find that whilst no party dominates, there 
is some evidence of bias (e.g. Giner and Arce, 2012; Kwok and Sharp, 2005; 
Hussein and Ketz, 1991). 
 
There is an expectation of neutrality from legitimacy theory. A standard-setter that 
shows favour to one group over any other puts at risk constituents’ perceptions of 
their procedure i.e. moral legitimacy in the form of procedural legitimacy. There is a 
wealth of prior work which indicates that standard-setters’ decisions and processes 
must be seen to be fair and free from bias (Hussein and Ketz, 1991; McEnroe, 1993; 
Fogarty, 1993; Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Chua and 
Taylor, 2008; Danjou and Walton, 2012). As the three forms of legitimacy – 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive – operate on a durability pendulum, an impairment to 
one form may have an impact a similar effect on the others (O’Dwyer, Owen and 
Unerman, 2011; Kumar and Das, 2007).  
 
Despite concerns that the IASB favours the elite accounting firms in the due process 
(US Senate, Metcalf Committee Report, 1976; Puro, 1984; Cooper and Sherer, 
1984; Hussein and Ketz, 1991; Mitchell and Sikka, 1993; Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012), instead we find that these firms are statistically significantly less 
influential. Whilst accounting firms’ comments are discussed fairly by the Board, this 
group’s moderate and major proposals are rejected in greater numbers than one 
would expect given the average proposal acceptance rates for constituents on the 
whole.  
 
In terms of jurisdictional influence, we find a negative bias towards UK comments 
and a positive bias towards US. These results could be interpreted as evidence to 
support the Anglo-American bias (Larson, 1997; Zeff, 2002; Botzem and Quack, 
2007). However, it would be foolhardy to rule out other explanations. Not least, that 
US standard-setters introduced similar reporting requirements before the IASB and 
therefore US constituents’ likely had superior knowledge and experience in this 
context. Therefore their comments may have been deemed to be more useful to the 
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process. There is a strong argument that standard-setting influence is context-
specific (e.g. Weetman, 2001; Martens and McEnroe, 1991, 1998; Cortese, Irvine 
and Kaidonis, 2010) and that the standard-setter should accept (reject) comments 
that improve (impair) the quality of the final reporting requirements (e.g. Larson, 
2002). Further, cognitive legitimacy is built over time and is highly durable therefore 
continuing active support – as evidenced in this study – suggests continued 
constituent support for the moral and pragmatic dimensions of legitimacy. 
 
In summary, this study provides a more sophisticated method to analyse 
constituents’ participation in the due process than basic vote-counting. We analyse 
whether certain stakeholders have greater relative levels of influence in terms of 
‘acceptance’ rates (which prior studies denote as ‘success’) and whether the 
comment is discussed. By drawing on a legitimacy theory framework, we propose 
that observably higher levels of influence can place at risk constituents’ perceptions 
of the standard-setting due process’ procedural legitimacy and, ultimately, the 
cognitive legitimacy of the organisation and the environment. However, given the 
often complex and mostly private decision-making element to the process, claims 
that higher influence is directly associated with a fall in perceptions of procedural 
legitimacy can be overly simplistic as context is important as are constituent 
knowledge and experience.  
 
There are two inter-related limitations of our study and we recommend future 
researchers follow this up. The first issue is that we consider one standard in 
isolation. It is possible that responses to this ED may have been influenced by a 
longer-term political or technical agenda which we cannot ascertain. We recommend 
that future researchers explore whether these results are generalisable between 
standards. Note, however, that the method of manual coding and analysis does not 
lend itself neatly to enquiries of large data sets. The researcher is required to apply 
their technical knowledge to be able to interpret the meaning of the comment and the 
subsequent discussion and interpretation. This means that it can be resource 
intensive, time-consuming work. Linked to the above is that the small sample makes 
more sophisticated statistical analysis approaches less employable and the results of 
those methods less robust.  
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Table 1: Categorisation system for the relative strength of responses 
 
Level Explanation Example(s) (paragraph references 
relate to the text from the Exposure 
Draft) 
Minor   Requests that do not 
alter the meaning of 
the requirement. 
 Requests for spelling or grammatical 
changes which do not materially alter 
the meaning of the requirement.  
    e.g. para 3 amended from: 
“However, entities shall apply this 
[draft] IFRS to an interest in a 
subsidiary, associate or joint venture 
that according to IAS 27, IAS 28 or 
IAS 31 is accounted for in 
accordance with IAS 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement. In these cases, 
entities shall apply the disclosure 
requirements in IAS 27, IAS 28 and 
IAS 31 in addition to those in this 
[draft] IFRS.” This exert was 
amended to read: “However, in some 
cases, IAS 27, IAS 28 or IAS 31 
permits an entity to account for an 
interest in a subsidiary, associate or 
joint venture using IAS 39; entities 
shall apply the requirements of this 
[draft] IFRS.”   
 
Moderate  Requests that 
propose moderate 
changes to either 
meaning or 
interpretation 
 Requests for spelling or grammatical 
changes which alter the meaning of 
the requirement in a material way  
 
 Requests for extra guidance on 
application  
    e.g. paragraph 27 was amended 
from: “whether its financial 
statements include financial 
instruments measured at fair values 
that are determined in full or in part 
using a valuation technique based on 
assumptions that are not supported 
by observable market prices or 
rates.” It now reads: “whether the fair 
values recognised or disclosed in the 
financial statements are determined 
in full or in part using a valuation 
technique based on assumptions that 
are not supported by prices from 
observable current market 
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transactions in the same instrument 
(i.e. without modification or 
repackaging) and not based on 
available observable market data.” 
  
 Requests for clarification of terms   
      e.g. paragraph 17, clarification of 
original text: “When an allowance 
account is used to reduce the 
carrying amount of financial assets 
impaired by credit losses an entity 
shall disclose a reconciliation of 
changes in the allowance account 
during the period for each class of 
financial assets.”  
Amended to read: “When financial 
assets are impaired by credit losses 
and the entity records the impairment 
in a separate account (e.g. an 
allowance account used to record a 
collective impairment of assets) 
rather than directly reducing the 
carrying amount of the asset, it shall 
disclose a reconciliation of changes 
in that account during the period for 
each class of financial assets. 
 
 
Major   Proposals that 
request fundamental 
changes 
 Requests for spelling or grammatical 
changes which alter the meaning of 
the requirement materially  
     e.g. paragraph 11, respondents 
asked for clarification to allow them to 
interpret and apply what was meant 
by: “the amount of change in it its fair 
value that is not attributable to 
changes in a benchmark interest 
rate”. Amended to read “the amount 
of change in its fair value that is not 
attributable to changes in market 
conditions that give rise to market 
risk”. In addition, a supplementary 
guidance note is appended 
describing what is meant by market 
conditions. 
 
 
 Requests for additional requirements 
(previously unconsidered in the 
exposure draft) to be included. 
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      e.g. paragraph 10, appended the 
statement, “either on the face of the 
balance sheet or in the notes” to the 
originally proposed requirement “The 
carrying amounts of each of the 
following classifications, as defined  
in IAS 39, shall be disclosed.” 
 
 Requests for deletions of 
requirements  
    e.g. paragraphs 46 – 48 
concerning ‘Capital’ being deleted. 
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Table 2 Analysis of the outcome-oriented comments made in response to ED 7 by stakeholder group   
 
 
  
Response weighting 
 
Discussed 
Proposed 
amendments 
accepted 
Total: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
Minor: 
Number  
(p-value) 
 
Moderate: 
Number 
(p-value) 
Major: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
Total 
 
Yes: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
No 
 
User 
 
6 
(0.3515)  
0 
N/A 
+ 0 
N/A 
+ 6 
(0.1567)  
6 
 
3 
N/A 
+ 3 
  
Preparers 
 
26 
(0.3831)  
2 
N/A 
+ 11 
(0.6571)  
13 
(0.4189)  
26 
 
25 
(0.3624)  
1 
  
Accounting 
firms 
 
24 
(0.9962)  
4 
N/A 
+ 13 
(0.9247)  
7 
(0.9985)  
24 
 
21 
(0.9732)  
3  
RPBs 
 
155 
(0.1882)  
10 
(0.0386) 
** 
73 
(0.4349)  
72 
(0.3316)  
155 
 
130 
(0.1281) 
  25 
 
 
211 
 
16 
 
97 
 
98 
 
211 
 
179 
 
32 
 
 
  
Response weighting 
 
Discussed 
Proposed 
amendments 
rejected 
Total: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
Minor: 
Number  
(p-value) 
 
Moderate: 
Number 
(p-value) 
Major: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
Total 
 
Yes: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
No 
 
User 
 
5 
(0.6485)  
0  
N/A 
+ 2 
N/A 
+ 3 
N/A 
 + 5 
 
2 
N/A 
+ 
3 
  
Preparers 
 
29 
(0.6169)  
0 
N/A 
+ 15 
(0.3429)  
14 
(0.5811)  
29 
 
18 
(0.6376)  
11 
  
Accounting 
firms 
 
55 
(0.0038) 
 *** 
4 
N/A 
+ 25 
(0.0753) 
* 
26 
(0.0015) 
*** 55 
 
29 
(0.0268) 
** 
26 
  
RPBs 
 
175 
(0.8118)  
4 
N/A 
+ 88 
(0.5651)  
83 
(0.6684)  
175 
 
86 
(0.8719) 
  
89 
 
 
 
264 
 
8 
 
130 
 
126 
 
264 
 
135 
 
129 
 
 
  
Response weighting 
 
Discussed 
Total 
proposed 
amendments 
Total 
 
Minor 
 
Moderate Major 
 
Total 
 
Yes: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
No: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
User 
 
11 
  
0 
  
2 
  
9 
  
11 
  
5 
(0.8592)  
6 
(0.1408)  
Preparers 
 
55 
  
2 
  
26 
  
27 
  
55 
  
43 
(0.0141) 
** 
12 
(0.9859)  
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Accounting 
firms 
 
79 
 
  
8 
  
38 
  
33 
 
  
79 
  
50 
(0.6182)  
29 
(0.3818)  
RPBs 
 
330 
  
14 
  
161 
  
155 
  
330 
  
216 
(0.4822) 
  
114 
(0.5178) 
 
 
475 
 
24 
 
227 
 
224 
 
475 
 
314   161 
  
 
The table above shows the number of outcome-oriented proposals accepted, rejected and in total by 
stakeholder group. The table also shows results from binomial distribution tests against the null 
hypotheses that there will be no significant differences between actual versus expected acceptances 
(rejections) and discussions of minor, major or moderate proposals. The following notation scheme is 
applied:  
*** = significant at the 1% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
* = significant at the 10% level 
+ = No result recorded. Cell frequency too low. 
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Table 3 Analysis of the outcome-oriented of comments made in response to ED 7 by jurisdiction  
 
 
Proposed amendments accepted 
          
 
Response weighting 
 
Discussed 
 
Total: 
Number 
(p-value) 
Minor: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
Moderate: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
Major: 
Number 
(p-value) 
  
Total 
 
Yes:  
Number  
(p-value) 
 
No 
 Europe 
 
89 
(0.5410) 
3 
N/A + 
46 
(0.5169) 
 
40 
(0.6775) 
  
89 
 
 
75 
(0.5371) 
 
14 
 
 ROTW 
 
27 
(0.6018) 
1 
N/A + 
15 
(0.6887) 
 
11 
(0.4490) 
  
27 
 
 
18 
(0.7368) 
 
9 
 
 UK 
 
48 
(0.8560) 
4 
N/A + 
15 
(0.9871) 
 
29 
(0.4450) 
  
48 
 
 
42 
(0.6476) 
 
6 
 
 US 
 
47 
(0.1180) 
8 
(0.0250) ** 
21 
(0.1184)   
18 
(0.7302)     
47 
   
44 
(0.0693) * 
3 
 
 
 
211 16 
 
97 
 
98 
  
211 
 
179 
 
32 
 Proposed amendments rejected 
          
 
Response weighting 
 
Discussed 
 
Total: 
Number 
(p-value) 
Minor: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
Moderate: 
Number 
(p-value) 
 
Major: 
Number 
(p-value) 
  
Total 
 
Yes:  
Number  
(p-value) 
 
No 
 Europe 
 
112 
(0.4590) 
1 
N/A + 
57 
(0.4831) 
 
54 
(0.3225) 
  
112 
 
 
57 
(0.4629) 
 
55 
 ROTW 
 
35 
(0.3982) 
2 
N/A + 
21 
(0.3113) 
 
12 
(0.5510) 
  
35 
 
 
18 
(0.2632) 
 
17 
 UK 
 
72 
(0.1440) 
3 
N/A + 
35 
(0.0129) 
** 
34 
(0.5550) 
  
72 
 
 
36 
(0.3524) 
 
36 
 US 
 
45 
(0.8820) 
2 
N/A + 
17 
(0.8816)   
26 
(0.2698)     
45 
   
24 
(0.9307)   
21 
 
 
264 8 
 
130 
 
126 
  
264 
 
135 
 
129 
 Total proposed amendments 
          
 
Response weighting 
 
Discussed 
 
Total Minor 
 
Moderate 
 
Major 
  
Total 
 
Yes:  
Number  
(p-value) 
 
No: 
Number 
(p-value) 
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Europe 
 
201 
 
4 
 
 
103 
 
 
94 
 
  
201 
 
 
132 
(0.6250) 
 
69 
(0.3750) 
 ROTW 
 
62 
 
3 
 
 
36 
 
 
23 
 
  
62 
 
 
36 
(0.8625) 
 
26 
(0.1375) 
 UK 
 
120 
 
7 
 
 
50 
 
 
63 
 
  
120 
 
 
78 
(0.5092) 
 
42 
(0.4908) 
 US 
 
92 
 
10 
   
38 
   
44 
     
92 
   
68 
(0.0326) ** 
24 
(0.9674) 
 
 
475 24 
 
227 
 
224 
  
475 
 
314 
 
161 
  
 
 
 
The table above shows the number of outcome-oriented proposals accepted, rejected and in total by 
jurisdiction. The table also shows results from binomial distribution tests against the null hypotheses 
that there will be no significant differences between actual versus expected acceptances (rejections) 
and discussions of minor, major or moderate proposals. The following notation scheme is applied:  
*** = significant at the 1% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
* = significant at the 10% level 
+ = No result recorded. Cell frequency too low. 
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Appendix A: Extract from the final level summary of the manual coding process: an analysis of 
responses to paragraph 17 of Exposure Draft 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures – accepted and 
rejected outcome-oriented comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paragraph 
number 
(ED 7) 
Scope of 
requirement(s) 
Section / 
Requirement 
Accepted 
changes: details 
Minor, 
Moderate, 
or Major 
Change? 
Constituent who 
proposed change? 
Were these 
changes 
discussed? 
Para 17 Significance of 
Financial 
Instruments for 
Financial 
Position and 
Performance 
Definition 
clarification 
Clarification of 
the allowance 
account 
definition  
Moderate CL10 German 
Accounting 
Standards 
Committee 
CL21 Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu 
International 
CL25 Japanese 
Bankers Association 
CL32 South African 
Institute of 
Chartered 
Accountants 
CL49 Conseil 
National de la 
Comptabilité (CNC) 
CL78 Institute of 
Chartered 
Accountants of New 
Zealand 
CL104 European 
Financial Reporting 
Advisory Group 
(EFRAG) 
 
Yes 
Paragraph 
number 
(ED 7) 
Scope of 
requirement(s) 
Section / 
Requirement 
Rejected 
changes: details 
Minor, 
Moderate, 
or Major 
Change? 
Constituent who 
proposed change? 
Were these 
changes 
discussed? 
Para 17 Significance of 
Financial 
Instruments for 
Financial 
Position and 
Performance 
Definition 
clarification / 
amendment 
Modification of 
the allowance 
account 
definition and 
disclosure 
requirements 
Major 
 
 
 
Major 
 
Moderate 
CL15 Raad voor de 
Jaarverslaggeving 
(Council for Annual 
Reporting) 
CL17 Syngenta 
International AG 
CL78 Institute of 
Chartered 
Accountants of New 
Zealand 
 
No 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
